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Non–technical summary
Under what conditions do firms increase or decrease their innovation expendi-
tures? What is the effect of knowledge flows between firms on their innovation
effort? What determines firms’ propensity to cooperatively conduct research?
In times of rapid technological progress and increased governmental interest in
innovation policy, these issues are high both on the political and on the industrial
economist’s agenda.
Empirical evidence on the determinants of research joint venture formation and
on the effects of these research cooperations on research efforts is scarce. Eco-
nomic theory thus often guides economic policy to optimally allocate research
and development subsidies. Economic theory traditionally assumes that a firm’s
ability to absorb knowledge from competitors is independent from it’s own re-
search expenditures. Such an assumption is unlikely to meet with reality well
since a firm which does not invest in research at all does not have any capacity to
absorb knowledge from other firms’ research programs. In this paper, the degree
to which firms are able to absorb knowledge is made dependent upon their own
research efforts: the more a firm invests in research, the more it can absorb from
other firms’ stock of knowledge. It turns out that the effect of research joint
ventures crucially depends upon the competitiveness of the market and upon the
generality of firms’ research approach. The model derived in this paper hence
leads to quite different conclusions than models ignoring the endogeneity of firms’
research approaches.
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Abstract: This paper derives a three stage Cournot duopoly game for research col-
laboration, research expenditures and product market competition. The amount of
knowledge firms can absorb is made dependent on their own research efforts, e.g. firms’
absorptive capacity is treated as an endogenous variable. It is shown that cooperat-
ing firms invest more in R&D than non–cooperating firms if spillovers are sufficiently
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cooperation on research efforts, implying that existing models which assume perfect
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1 Introduction
In 1952, John Kenneth Galbraith noted that the ‘era of cheap innovation’ was
over. He claimed that firms had exhausted low–cost R&D programs and were
now forced to pool their R&D efforts in order to achieve scientific progress and to
gain and to retain market power. Until the mid–eighties, however, antitrust law
hampered firms’ collaboration in the R&D process. More than 30 years passed by
since Galbraith’s statement before US and European governments considerably
relaxed antitrust law to allow cooperative R&D.
Starting points of this relaxation were the positive results from some German
and US research collaborations. Spencer and Grindley (1993) argue that the
R&D consortium SEMATECH contributed significantly to the leading position
of the US in semiconductor industries. Jorde and Teece (1990) trace the success
of German mechanical engineering products in the seventies and eighties back to
the partly industrially–financed research institutions.
For Germany, a strong increase in the number of research joint ventures (RJVs)
can be observed. While only ten percent of all manufacturing firms in Germany
were involved in R&D cooperations in 1971, 20 years later almost half of all the
firms in manufacturing industries conducted cooperative research (Ko¨nig et al.,
1994). Based on US Department of Justice data, Vonortas (1997) shows that a
sharp increase in the number of RJVs is also present in the US. The interest of
economic policy in RJVs is still unchanged since R&D subsidies are increasingly
often bound to joint R&D efforts.
Microeconomists began to develop theoretical frameworks to describe R&D ex-
penditure and R&D cooperation in the mid–eighties. Pioneering contributions
on R&D investment with spillovers are Brander and Spencer (1983), Katz (1986)
and Spence (1986). A large strand of the more recent literature is built on
D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988, 1990), who develop a two–stage Cournot
duopoly game for R&D expenditures and product market competition. Many
subsequent papers adopted the structure of this model with modifications. A
particular relevant extension is that of Kamien et al. (1992), who introduce
oligopoly markets and also allow the degree of product substitution to vary be-
tween perfect complements and perfect substitutes. In fact, the contribution of
Kamien et al. is more than just an extension of D’Aspremont and Jacquemin as
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Amir (2000) has recently pointed out. He shows that the two models have some
quite different implications, e.g. with respect to R&D levels under alternative co-
operation scenarios. A survey of the existing literature on research cooperations
can be omitted here since extensive reviews by De Bondt (1996), Cohen (1995)
and Geroski (1995) already exist. While the first author is mainly concerned
with theoretical contributions to the literature, the latter summarizes empirical
findings.1
A main question of the literature on RJV formation is: ‘Does cooperative R&D
increase or decrease R&D efforts?’. The common answer is that it depends on
the relation of the level of spillovers to a term usually consisting of product sub-
stitutability and market demand. Research spillovers arise whenever knowledge
produced by firm i is voluntarily or involuntarily given to some other firm j with-
out firm j having paid for it. If spillovers are sufficiently large, R&D investment
under RJV exceeds that of competition. Intuitively, there are two opposing ef-
fects of research joint ventures on research efforts. Due to the internalization of
spillover — it is assumed that knowledge is fully exchanged in an RJV —, R&D
investment is stimulated. Business–stealing counteracts this positive effect on
R&D spending and may dominate the positive effect attributable to the internal-
ization of technical spillovers. The competition effect depends upon the degree
of product substitution so that this factor is a main determinant of the effect of
joint research on research spending. This point is detailed in Section 2 below.
The theoretical part of this paper shares the essential features of the D’Aspremont
and Jacquemin (1988, 1990) model. As in Kamien et al. (1992), the D’Aspremont
and Jacquemin framework is extended to explicitly model the R&D cooperation
decision. Firms’ R&D expenditure level, their R&D decision and their compe-
tition on the output market is modelled in a three–stage duopoly game. In the
first stage, firms decide whether or not to conduct R&D in cooperation. In the
second stage, they decide upon their R&D expenditures. Lastly, they compete
in a Cournot–duopoly product market.
While in most existing studies — with the exception of Kamien and Zang (2000)
— the extend to which firms can absorb knowledge is assumed to be exogenously
determined, it is treated as a function of own innovation efforts this paper. The
model developed here is closely related to that of Kamien and Zang (2000) but
1Also see the special issue of ‘Annales d’E´conomie et de Statistique’, vol. 49/50 (1998), on
‘The Economics and Econometrics of Innovation’ and the references cited therein.
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takes into account more complex and interesting market demand function since
it does not restrict products to be perfect substitutes as in Kamien and Zang.
As it shall turn out later on the answer to the question whether or not research
effort is larger under cooperation than under competition hinges upon the degree
of product substitution.
While existing studies usually do not take into account the endogeneity of ab-
sorptive capacity, it in fact appears to be unlikely that firms can gain from
each other’s knowledge independently of their own research effort. Cohen and
Levinthal (1989) have empirically shown and theoretically described that firms’
absorptive capacity critically depends on own research efforts. In traditional
models, it is assumed that even a firm which does not invest in R&D at all gains
from the stock of knowledge to an identical extent as another firm which spends
a large amount of money on research.
Important and empirically testable findings of the theoretical model are (i) that
research efforts are larger under RJV than under competition if exogenous spillovers
are sufficiently large, (ii) that an increase in R&D productivity positively affects
both R&D efforts and RJV formation and (iii) that an increase in market demand
leads to an increase in R&D efforts. Under the condition that the direct effect of
changes in market demand, in the elasticity of product substitution and in the
generality of the R&D approach is larger than the effect of these changes in inno-
vation efforts, the following additional conclusions can be drawn: (i) increasing
market demand and (ii) an increasing generality of the R&D approach provide
incentives to form RJVs while (iii) an increase in product substitutability has
negative effects on RJV formation.
2 Model
2.1 Market demand
In order to keep things tractable and interpretable, this paper deals with process
innovation only. In Kaiser and Licht (1998), we consider both process and product
R&D in a Cournot oligopoly framework with exogenous spillovers. We show that
the optimality conditions for product and process R&D have virtually the same
structure and that results obtained for product R&D are qualitatively also valid
for process R&D.
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Let the market be characterized by two one–product firms producing products i
and j. Market demand is linear and given by:
pi = 1 − bσqj − bqi, (1)
where pi denotes the price of firm i’s product and qi (qj) denotes the quantity of
product i (j). The parameter σ is a measure of substitutability of the two goods
with σ ∈ [0, 1]. If σ = 1, the two goods are perfect substitutes and if σ = 0,
the two goods are perfect complements (this is the monopoly case). The term b
denotes inverse market demand, the ratio of the number of firms over the number
of customers.
2.2 R&D production function
Following the tradition of R&D cooperation models (c.f. Kamien et al., 1992),
market structure is modelled as a Cournot game in which firms can decrease
production costs by conducting R&D. R&D efforts do not only contribute to a
reduction of own production costs but also spill over to competitors, customers
or suppliers. R&D–performing firms, however, have the possibility of conducting
R&D in cooperation with other firms. In this case, results of R&D are assumed
to be fully exchanged. By performing cooperative R&D, firms can internalize
the externalities related to the R&D process. The deterministic R&D model sug-
gested here falls short of real innovation processes which are driven by risk and
irreversibilities.2
The main assumptions on production techniques, R&D spillovers and R&D pro-
duction functions are briefly introduced below. The production conditions are
captured by a cost function ki. By conducting R&D, firms can decrease marginal
costs. Denoting Xi the effective level of R&D — own R&D plus R&D received
from other firms — of firm i, the unit cost function of firm i is assumed to be
given by:
ki = ci − f(Xi), (2)
where f(Xi) denotes the R&D production function of process innovation and ci
denotes fixed costs. The cost function (2) represents per–unit production costs
2Beaudreau (1996) discusses a model that takes into account the uncertainty and multidi-
mensionality without, however, finding markedly different results compared to contributions
based on the D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988, 1990) framework.
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which are measured in monetary units. It is required that
f(0) = 0, f(Xi) < ci, f
′(Xi) > 0, f ′′(Xi) < 0, (3)
limXi→∞ f
′(Xi) → 0 and (1− ki)f ′′(Xi) + f ′(Xi)2 < 0.
These assumptions assure that no process innovation is achieved if it is not in-
vested in R&D, production costs are positive, the R&D production function is
increasing and concave in effective R&D, marginal productivity of R&D goes to
zero as effective R&D approaches infinity and that R&D costs show a steeper
increase than the returns of R&D so that it is prevented that firms boundlessly
invest in R&D.
Following Kamien and Zang (2000), firm i’s effective R&D, Xi, depends upon
own R&D, xi and the spillovers firm i receives from the other firm. Both effec-
tive and own R&D are measured in monetary units. Effective R&D is assumed
to be given by
Xi = xi + (1− δ) β xδix1−δj (4)
with δ, β ∈ [0, 1].3 Equation (4) implies that if firm i does not invest in R&D at
all, it cannot receive any spillovers from other firms’ research efforts.
The parameter β denotes the exogenously–given intensity of R&D spillovers. It
can, e.g. be interpreted as a parameter reflecting the degree of patent protection.
For β = 0, patents perfectly protect research results, for β = 1, patents are com-
pletely unable to protect research results; β reflects the restricted possibility to
protect research results.
The parameter δ denotes firm i’s “R&D approach” (Kamien and Zang, 2000, p.
998). That is, if δ = 0, firms are both universal recipients from and universal
donors of other firms’ R&D efforts (‘general R&D approach’). Firm i’s effective
R&D function then reduces to the standard formulation of effective R&D (e.g.,
Beath et al., 1998; D’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988, 1990; Kamien et al., 1992)
for duopolies, Xi = xi + βxj.
At the other extreme, with δ = 1, effective R&D is equal to own R&D. Then,
firms are neither able to internalize any of the other firms’ knowledge nor do they
contribute to other firms’ effective R&D (‘specific R&D approach’). If δ lies in
between the two extreme cases, effective R&D is homogeneous of degree one in
xi.
3In the original paper by Kamien and Zang (2000), firms decide upon δ in an additional
stage of a Cournot oligopoly game.
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Hence, the parameter δ reflects how applied, as opposed to how specific, how ori-
ented towards science, the research program is. For large values of δ, the research
program is focused on basic research whereas it aims at applied research for small
values of δ.
2.3 Stage III: Product market competition with R&D ex-
penditures given
The R&D oligopoly game is solved by backwards induction. In stage III of the
game, the two firms choose the optimal level of output given sunk costs. Collusive
agreements concerning the level of output are ruled out. Firms maximize their
profits, Π, independently by choosing the optimal level of output qi:
maxqi Πi = (pi − ki)qi − xi. (5)
Optimal output is derived by using the Cournot assumption and is given by
q∗i =
(1− ki) + σ2−σ
(
(1− ki)− (1− kj)
)
b(2 + σ)
. (6)
Comparative–static analysis shows, see Appendix A, that an increase in the de-
gree of substitutability leads to a decrease in own output, that own output in-
creases with market size and that it decreases if more specific R&D approaches
are chosen.
2.4 Stage II: Determination of the R&D level
In the second stage of the game, firms maximize profits by optimally choosing
R&D efforts. If firms decide not to cooperate in R&D in the first stage of the
game, firm i’s profit function is given by:
maxxi Πi = b q
∗
i (xi, xj)
2 − xi, (7)
In a symmetric equilibrium, where firm subscripts can be omitted, optimal R&D
expenditures follow from the first order condition:
Ψc =
f ′(Xc)(1− c+ f(Xc)) 2
(
2 + β(1− δ)(δ(2 + σ)− σ)
)
b(2− σ)(2 + σ)2 − 1 = 0 (8)
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where Xc denotes effective R&D of firm i under separate profit maximization
(Cournot). The impact of spillovers on R&D expenditures under R&D competi-
tion is ambiguous. It is positive if
f ′(Xc)(δ(2 + σ)− σ)(1− k)| {z } + xc(2 + β(1− δ)(δ(2 + σ)− σ)(f ′(Xc)2 + (1− k)f ′′(Xc))| {z } > 0
(+) (−)
technological competitive
spillover spillover
(9)
and negative otherwise.4 This condition simply states that there are two effects
working against one another in a RJV: there are positive technological spillovers
which arise from the joint use of research results and there are negative com-
petitive spillovers which are due to the fact that firm i can use firm j’s research
results to improve its relative competitive position.
If firms decide to cooperate in R&D in the first stage of the game, they maximize
joint profits over their R&D efforts. The optimal R&D equations of Kamien et
al. (1992) are obtained by neglecting the endogeneity of absorptive capacity by
setting δ = 0. Under RJV — as, e.g. in Kamien et al. (1992) — full information
sharing is assumed, β takes on the value 1:
maxxi,xj Π = b q
∗
i (xi, xj)
2 − xi + b q∗j (xi, xj)2 − xj, (10)
which leads to the following first–order–condition:
Ψjv =
f ′(Xjv)(1− c+ f(Xjv)) 2 (1− δ)
b(2 + σ)2
− 1 = 0 (11)
where Xjvi denotes effective R&D expenditures under joint profit maximization.
The consequences of research collaboration for the level of R&D expenditures in
the case of R&D cooperation can be drawn from comparing equations (11) and
(8) and using the set of assumptions (3). For sufficiently large spillovers, e.g.,
β ≥ (2− σ)(2− δ)− 2
(1− δ)(δ(2 + σ)− σ) , (12)
R&D efforts are larger under RJV than under Cournot competition. Condition
(12) is always satisfied for specific R&D approaches, δ > 2 −
(
2/(2 − σ)
)
. The
difference to the Kamien et al. (1992) special case of truly exogeneous spillovers
4Note the difference for δ = 0: under exogenous spillovers, the impact of an increase in
exogenous spillovers on R&D expenditures is unambiguously negative if goods are substitutes.
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(δ = 0) are striking since in their model research efforts are always larger under
RJV than in research competition. In the Kamien and Zang (2000) model with
σ = 1, firms choose R&D approaches which ensure that the cooperative R&D
exceeds noncooperative R&D if β ≥ 0.5.
The extreme cases of perfect competition and perfect substitution are also con-
tained in the model presented here. If goods are perfect substitutes in the model
presented here, the cooperative level of R&D exceeds the noncooperative level
if the R&D approach is sufficiently specific: δ > 1/3, implying that in the case
of tough competition, business–stealing effects due to cooperation overweigh the
internalization effects only if the R&D approach is not to general. In the other
extreme case, the monopoly case with σ = 0, the cooperative R&D levels never
exceed the noncooperative ones. This is quite unsurprising since there are no in-
centives to cooperate in R&D in monopoly, at least in models which focus on the
in terms of policy relevance more interesting horizontal spillovers.5 The contour
plot of equation (12) displayed in Figure 1 visualizes the effects of the alternative
combinations of the degree of product substitution, σ and the generality of the
R&D approach, δ. It is restricted to be in the [0,1] range since β also is in [0,1]
so that condition (12) is always met in the black area while it is never met in the
white area in Figure 1, for example if σ = 0 as pointed out above. A decrease
in the generality of the R&D approach has two opposing effects on the incentive
too form an RJV. On the one hand, involuntary knowledge leakage is reduced.
On the other hand, firms gain from one another’s knowledge to a lesser extend
if they pursue narrow R&D approaches. Which effect actually overweighs — i.e.
if competition effects exceed internalization effects — depends upon the market
structure, implying that it is worthwhile to consider more complex market struc-
tures instead of focussing attention to the extreme case of perfect substitution.
Other results from comparative–static analysis, see Appendix B, of equations (8)
and (11) are that (i) an increase in R&D generality leads to an increase in research
efforts under research competition if the research approach already is sufficiently
general, e.g. δ < σ/(2 + σ), while the effect in the case of research cooperation
is not determined a priori,6 (ii) an increase in the degree of substitutability has
5A theoretical model distinguishing between vertical and horizontal cooperation is presented
by Inkmann (2000). Harhoff (1996, 1997) and Peters (1995, 1997) consider strategic investment
in R&D which spills over to downstream suppliers.
6Research expenditures increase with a decrease in R&D generality if f ′ (1 − k) + x (1 −
δ) (f ′2 + (1− k) f ′′) < 0.
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Figure 1: Contour plot of equation (12)
Note: The darker the shaded areas are, the more likely it is that cooperative R&D is larger
than noncooperative R&D, and vice versa. The completely white area indicates that under
the corresponding σ/δ–combinations cooperative R&D always is smaller than noncooperative
R&D.
a disincentive effect on research efforts under competition if σ < 2/3; the effect
of product substitution on optimal R&D under cooperation is not determined,
(iii) an increase in market demand leads to an increase in research efforts both
under RJV and competition, and (iv) an increase in R&D productivity positively
affects research efforts in both cases as well.7
2.5 Stage I: R&D cooperation
Incentives for firms to cooperatively conduct R&D become apparent from com-
paring the level of profits firms earn with and without cooperation. An RJV is
started if:
Πjvi − Πci = b (qjvi )
2 − xjvi − b (qci )2 + xci > 0. (13)
Both profit functions are globally concave in xi as long as conditions (3) hold.
Incentives to start a research joint venture increase with increasing differences in
profits.
7The last result is not shown in Appendix B since it is obvious from equations (8) and (11).
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Incentives to start an RJV increase with increasing exogenous spillovers, β, if
εxc,β > f
′[Xc] εxc,β with εxc,β denoting the elasticity of research expenditures
with respect to spillovers.
Increases in R&D productivity create incentives to form an RJV. Provided that
the direct effects of changes in the generality of the R&D approach, in market
demand and in product substitutability are larger than their indirect effects via
research efforts, increases in (i) the generality of the R&D approach8 and (ii)
in product substitutability create incentive effects to RJV formation. (iii) An
increase in market demand leads to an increased likelihood of RJV formation.
2.6 Testable model implications
The hypotheses derived from the theoretical model can be summarized as follows:
1. An increase in research productivity has a positive effect on RJV formation.
2. An increase in the generality of a firm’s R&D approach creates incentive to
form an RJV.
3. An increase in market demand has a positive effect on RJV formation.
4. Research efforts are larger under RJV than under research competition
provided that spillovers are sufficiently large.
5. An increase in research productivity has a positive effect on R&D expendi-
tures.
6. An increase in the generality of a firm’s R&D approach leads to an increase
in R&D expenditures under research competition provided that the R&D
approach already is sufficiently general.
7. An increase in market demand has a positive effect on R&D expenditures.
These hypotheses are empirically tested on the basis of German service sector
data by Kaiser (2001), who finds that his estimation results are broadly con-
sistent with the predictions of the model derived here. The empirical evidence
provided by Kaiser and Licht (1998) for German manufacturing industries, who
8Note that if firms pursue a very specific R&D approach (δ = 1), there are no incentives at
all to collaborate in R&D since absorptive capacity is zero in this case.
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do not consider endogenous absorptive capacity, also is in accordance to the
hypotheses listed above. An insignificant impact of both vertical cooperations
(cooperations between a firm and its suppliers or/and customers) and horizontal
cooperations (cooperations among competitors) on the R&D intensity of German
firms is found by Inkmann (2000). He also finds significant negative effects of
intra–industry spillovers on R&D intensity and a significantly positive effect of
inter–industry spillovers, while horizontal spillovers increase the tendency to co-
operate with customers. Cassiman and Veugelers (1999) analyze Belgian firms
to uncover the differential effects of incoming and outgoing spillovers and find
that firms with large incoming spillovers and lower outgoing spillovers (better
appropriation) have a higher probability of cooperating in R&D.
Other empirical work on RJVs has focused on the anatomy of the research part-
ners. Kleinknecht and Reijnen (1992) study the determinants of research coop-
eration in Dutch manufacturing industries. They come to the quite surprising
conclusion that firm size does not have a significant effect on the propensity to
cooperate. By contrast, the existence of an R&D department, granted patents,
licensing and sectoral affiliation significantly affect firms’ propensity to cooper-
ate. The results by Kleinknecht and Reijnen (1992) may suffer from simultaneous
equation bias. Ro¨ller et al. (1998) use a simultaneous equation setup. In their
analysis of U.S. firms that participate in RJVs they find a tendency towards co-
operation among firms of similar size and that RJV formation is dependent on a
number of industry–specific effects. Veugelers (1993) describes the profile of 668
international research alliances and finds that improved market access, monitor-
ing and control as well as complementarities in assets drive cooperative research.
3 Conclusions
In this paper a three stage Cournot–oligopoly game for product market compe-
tition, optimal R&D effort and research cooperation is derived. In contrast to
most existing studies, the degree to which firms can absorb knowledge from other
firms’ R&D efforts is made dependent on their own research expenditures: firms
which do not invest in R&D are unable to retrieve any knowledge from competi-
tors.
The theoretical framework is closely related to Kamien and Zang (2000) but
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considers a more complex and more interesting market demand function since it
does not restrict products to be perfect substitutes. It turns out that the crucial
economic question if research expenditures are larger under research cooperation
than under research competition crucially depends on the degree of product sub-
stitution. Intuitively, two opposing effects determine if research expenditures are
larger in an RJV than in research competition: a positive internalization effect
and a negative competition, or business–stealing, effect. The degree of product
substitution of course is a main determinant of the degree related to the business–
stealing effect so that it in fact appears worthwhile not to restrict goods to be
perfect substitutes as in Kamien and Zang (2000).
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Appendix A: Comparative–static properties of the product quantity equa-
tion (6)
Degree of product substitution, σ:
∂ qi
∂ σ
= − x β f
′
b (2 + σ)
< 0 in symmetric equilibrium (14)
Inverse market size, b:
∂ qi
∂ b
= − 1− c+ f
b2 (2 + σ)
< 0 in symmetric equilibrium (15)
Generality of R&D approach, δ (i.e. change in output if R&D approach becomes
more specific):
∂ qi
∂ δ
= − x β f
′
b (2 + σ)
< 0 in symmetric equilibrium (16)
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Appendix B: Comparative–static properties of optimal process innovation
spending, equations (8) and (11)
Since the partial derivatives of Ψc and Ψjv with respect to process innovation
spending, x, are negative under both regimes, the partial derivatives of Ψc and
Ψjv with respect to σ, b and δ directly determine the effect of the respective
variables on process innovation expenditures.
Cournot competition:
∂ Ψc
∂ x
=
2(1 + β(1− δ)) (2 + β(1− δ)(δ(2 + σ)− σ)) (f ′2 + (1− k) g′′)
b(2− σ)(2 + σ)2 < 0(17)
RJV:
∂ Ψjv
∂ x
=
2(2− δ)(1− δ)(f ′2 + (1− k)f ′′)
b(2 + σ)2
< 0 (18)
Effect of σ
Cournot competition:
∂ Ψc
∂ σ
=
4(2− 3σ + β(δ − 1)(σ + 2δσ − 2 + (δ − 1)σ2))(k − 1)f ′
b(σ − 2)2(2 + σ)3 < 0 (19)
if σ < 2/3
RJV:
∂ Ψjv
∂ σ
=
f ′(1− k) + x(1− δ)(f ′2 + (1− k)f ′′)
b(2 + σ)3
→ undetermined (20)
Effect of b
Cournot competition:
∂ Ψc
∂ b
= − 2(2 + β(1− δ)(δ(2 + σ − σ)))(1− k)g
′
b2(2− σ)(2 + σ)2 < 0 (21)
RJV:
∂ Ψjv
∂ b
= − 2(1− δ)(1− k)g
′
b2(2 + σ2)
< 0 (22)
Effect of δ
Cournot competition:
∂ Ψc
∂ δ
=
2β(2 + (1 + σ − δ(2 + σ))(1− k)g′ − x(2 + β(1− δ)(2δ − (1− δ)σ))(f ′2 + (1− k)f ′′))
b(2− σ)(2 + σ)2)2 < 0 (23)
if δ < σ/(2 + σ)
RJV:
∂ Ψjv
∂ δ
= − 2(f
′(1− k) + x(1− δ)(f ′2 + (1− k)f ′′))
b(2 + σ)2
→ undetermined (24)
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